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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
LAVELL A.DESBOUILLONS, and 
HENRIETTA R. DESBOUILLONS 
Plaintiff-Respondents 
vs. 
KENNETH 0. HOLT and 
VERDELL T. HOLT 
Defendant-Appellants 
STATE OF UTAH 
Case No. 15297 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case is the result of the consolidation of two actions: The 
first, initiated by the plaintiffs in this matter for the enforcement of 
rent payments pursuant with written leases; the second, being initiated 
by the defendants in this action complaining Breach of Contract against 
the plaintiffs. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Honorable Judge Ronald Hyde, in a trial without a jury, entered 
a Judgment of no cause of action on defendants claim for Breach of 
Contract and damages, and entered Judgment in favor of the plaintiffs 
and against the defendants for unpaid rent from July, 1974 through 
September 15, 1975. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant-Appellant seeks an Order of this Honorable court 
reversing the Judgment of the lower Court, and for an Order entering 
Judgment in favor of the defendants for Breach of Contract; or in lieu 
thereof, for an Order of this Honorable Court reversing the Judgment 
of the lower Court and directing that the lower Court enter a Judgment 
and Findings and Conclusions that because there was never a meeting 
of the minds between the parties, the written agreements between them 
are invalid and unenforceable. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On October 6, 1973, plaintiffs and defendants entered into a 
written agreement of certain real property located in the City of 
Ogden. The testimony before the Second District Court indicates that 
the parties intended to enter into a Lease of a building and improvements, 
including a blacktop area designated by the plaintiff(lessor.as a 
customer parking area. The real property discussed by the parties 
and identified as the parking area was included in the legal descriptioo 
of the Lease, but the building which defendants thought they 1vere also 
leasing was not included in the legal description. Said Lease (See 
Exhibit 1) was prepared by plaintiff's attorney at the request of the 
plaintiff. After the execution of said Lease, the defendants went in~ 
possession of the property which they thought was leased to them; 
extensively remodeled the same; and thereafter, the defendants opened 
the building for business. 
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In the early part of November, 1973, plaintiffs informed the 
defendants that a certain advertising sign was not intended to be in-
. eluded in the original Lease (See Exhibit 1), and so plaintiffs prepared, 
and the parties executed a written Lease of said sign as part of an 
original transaction. The sign is not in fact situated on either 
portion of ground described in Exhibit 1, but is installed on the 
real property which was omitted from the Lease. 
After executing all of the aforementioned Leases, and after 
extensive monies had been spent for moving, renovating, and repair, 
defendants began to encounter parking conflicts with the operator of 
a cafe situated on the area described as customer parking. Though some 
effort was made to work out an accord between the cafe operators and 
the defendants, the situation was never resolved. The defendants, 
after being informed by the cafe operator that he intended to install 
a fence adjacent to the building which defendants thought they had 
leased,discovered that the real property demised to them in the Lease 
was not owned or controlled by the plaintiffs, and shortly thereafter 
vacated the premises after an unsuccessful attempt to resolve the problem 
with the plaintiffs. 
In spite of a request to resolve the problem, which was mailed 
to the plaintiffs by the defendants in September of 1975 (See Defendants 
Exhibit 2 and Defendants Exhibit 5), the plaintiffs ignored the parking 
problem and the ownership problem, and commenced an action against the 
defendants seeking only for the enforcement of rent. Plaintiffs'Complaint 
made no mention of the defect pointed out in defendant's letter. 
Defendants concurrently instituted an action for Breach of Contract 
against the plaintiffs and the two actions were consolidated in the case 
at hand. 
-3-
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
h~EROUS DEFECTS IN THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW RE-
QUIRE THE JUDGHENT OF THE LOWER COURT TO BE OVERTURNED BECAUSE THE 
EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE FINDINGS; NOR DO THE FINDINGS COHPLY 
WITH LAH IN THE STATE OF UTAH, AND SAID FINDINGS ARE BASED IN PART 
ON INADHISSIBLE EVIDENCE. 
In a trial before a Judge without a jury, it is the obligation 
of the ruling Judge to determine the facts; and on the basis of those 
facts, to arrive at legal conclusions which are consonant with the 
law of this state or as it may otherwise apply to the facts. In 
the case of Sandall v. Hoskins, et al., in the Supreme Court of Utah, 
137 P 2d 819 (1943), this Court went into some considerable detail 
describing the nature of Findings and Conclusions. In particular, 
the C )Urt stated, "(W)hat should really be contained in the Findings 
of Facts are those facts on each issue which are necessary to make 
flow from them a law conclusion or to make such law conclusions in-
telligible.'' In no event can the Court arrive at facts, regardless 
of their "ultimate factual nature" or "mixed nature" if the same is 
not found in the evidence or reasonably concluded or deducted from the 
evidence; and especially if the same controverts the actual evidence 
before the Court. 
-
In this case, several findings of the lower Court in fact contr~i 
the evidence submitted by both the plaintiffs and defendants. The sta 
ments of the plaintiffs, in whose favor a Judgment has been rendered 
herein, are consistant with the statements of the defendants, but in-
consistant withfue findings. To facilitate this Court's understandi~ 
of these inconsistancies, each of the defective findings are hereafter 
set forth. The specific evidence and testimony which controvert said 
-4-
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findings are set forth thereafter by page and line or exhibit number. 
Finding of Fact Number 3 states, that said written lease contained 
a legal description which is not the correct legal description of the 
property in question. Said legal description was taken from an un-
executed document entitled "Easement," which was drawn by plaintiff's 
counsel to settle the parking arrangement between plaintiff and his 
neighbor, Tony Dekazos. Said "Easement" document contained both descriptions, 
and in drawing the Lease, the scrivener, plaintiff's attorney, claimed 
that he had included the parking area by mistake. Nonetheless, 
the defendant believed he was leasing the parking area. In the 
Transcript, Page 21 Lines 9 through 15, plaintiff (Desbouillons) said, 
Q: Was there ever a discussion concerning parking, Mr. Desbouillons? 
A: Yes 
Q: Do you recall when and where this conversation took place? 
A: It was during the·times that Ken was checking the property, 
and it was part of the overall decision. 
On page 42, and beginning with Line 4, Mr. Desbouillons stated 
that the parking behind, and around the Cedars Lounge was an integral 
part of Mr. Holt's decision to lease the building, and more specifically 
stated as follows, beginning at Line 18. 
Mr. Rothey: And isn't it a fact that that parking area that you 
pointed out physically to Mr. Holt is described 1n the first 
legal description of Paragraph l of the Lease? 
Mr. Desbouillons: Yes. 
Further,on Pages 67 and 68, in the testimony of Mr. Holt under 
direct examination, Mr. Holt states that he agreed or understood that 
he was going to lease the building, its fixtures, and the parking lot, 
and that parking was absolutely necessary to the operation of his business. 
-5-
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Q: As a result of all of these discussions what did you agree 
or what did you understand that you were going to do? 
A: I agreed, or I understood, that I was going to lease the 
building and all its fixtures, the property, including the 
parking lot. 
Q: And as a result of all of those discussions did you sign 
the lease which is marked Exhibit 1? 
A: Yes, I did. 
Mr. Desbouillons, as previously quoted from Transcript Page 
42, Lines 18 through 21, confirmed that the first legal description 
in Exhibit 1 was the area described by him to Mr. Holt as the parking 
area for the building situated at 20th and Washington Blvd. The 
first legal description in Exhibit 1 is identical to the first legal 
description in Exhibit 15, and was admitted as evidence over the 
objection of counsel for defendants on the basis of parol evidence 
(Transcript Page 24, Lines 15 through 20; and Page 23 Lines 21 through 
28). It is clear from these facts that the legal description contained il 
Exhibit 1 was, in fact, a correct legal description of the property callei 
the "parking property" in question in this lawsuit. The Courts' 
finding controverts that testimony of plaintiff and the defendant 
with respect to the parking area; and further controverts Exhibit 1, 
which was offered and admitted without objection; and Exhibit 15, which 
was offered by the plaintiffs over the defendants objection, and is 
therefore binding upon the plaintiffs. 
The Court further found as part of Finding Number 3, that the 
real property description in the Lease was the result of a "scribbler" 
(sic) error. Such a conclusion dehors the record (Finding of Facts 
Paragraph 9. Conclusions of Law P~ragraph 2 and 9). The only place 
in the transcript reflecting scriveners error is contained on Page 
-6-
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62 and 63, and is merely argument of counsel for plaintiff; and not 
admissible evidence. It states as follows: 
Hr. Vlahos: Yes, It's a scrivener's error, and I take full 
responsibility for the error, and I ask the court to amend 
the pleadings to conform with the fact that the correct 
description should be as indicated in the deed where Mr. 
Desbouillons sold the property, because that was the 
property that he in fact did lease, and our position is he has 
had peaceful possession of it the entire time until he 
moved out. 
There is no question in this respect that the plaintiffs 
prepared the written Lease, (Exhibit 1; Transcript Page 67, Lines 
11 through 18). 
In addition to preparing the Lease, plaintiffs requested their 
counsel, in an unrelated matter, to prepare an agreement between the 
plaintiffs and persons not party to this lawsuit. That agreement 
was objected to by defendant's counsel on the basis of materiality, 
(Transcript Page 3, Line 22 through 27), and on the basis of Parol 
(Transcript Page 24, Line 15 through 19), but the C~urt, nevertheless, 
allowed said document into evidence and has based material findings 
and conclusions on said document. 
The plaintiff's Complaint raises no claim that the regular 
description contained in the Lease wasan error, and the law of this 
state requires that any error in a written document be specifically pleaded 
before evidence of such error can be introduced at trial . Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure 9B. 
This rule, of course, is limited to those factual circumstances 
where the document contains ambiguity. In this case, the court has 
made no finding that the Lease was ambiguous and the defendants respectfully 
submit that the court therefore erred in two respects, with respect to 
allowing Exnibit 15 into evidence, and its "Finding Number 4." 
-7-
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At no place in the transcript is there any evidence to show that 
the intention of the parties was to lease only the property on the 
corner (emphasis supplied). The record reflects the fact that it 
was the intention of the parties to lease the property on the corner 
of 20th and Washington Blvd. as we 11 as the parking lot. (See Transcript 
Page 42, Line 14 through 21, testimony of the plaintiff; Transcript 
Page 67 Line 21 through 24, testimony of the defendant). In light of 
the testimony of both the plaintiff and defendant in this case, it 
is clear error on the part of the Court to find, as a matter of fact, 
that the intention of the parties was to do something other than 
what the parties informed the Court. The rule of law allows the trial 
Court considerable discretion in believing or disbelieving the testimony 
of any witnesses; but it does not allow the trial Court the discretion 
to disregard totally the testimony of both plaintiff and defendant wi~ 
respect to their intention in forming the written agreement. Finding 
of Fact Number 4, if it is to meet the criteria of Sandall v. Hoskins, 
et al, (op. cit.), should, therefore, be amended to reflect the actual 
intention of the parties. 
In addition, Finding Number 4 is inconsistant with Finding 
Number 6, which states that the defendants were we 11 aware of the parkin! '1 
belonging to said property and should be amended in any event to conforn I 
I 
with Finding Number 6. If the defendants were aware of the parking, 
and if the plaintiff included it in the lease, how can the Court find tn.: 
i 
the parties did not intend to do that which they in fact did. 
.I 
The classl.! 
sense of intent is manifested in conduct of affirmative action. 
Finding Number 7 is not a Finding of Fact within the meaning of the 
Sandall case. First of all, it is not credible to the defendant that the i 
-8-
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court could find in Number 6 that the defendant was well aware of the 
parking as part of the lease, and then cavalierly proceed in Finding 
Number 7 to reform the agreement specifically excluding the parking. 
It is not the defendant's contention that the Court could not reasonably 
conclude from the evidence that the real property situated on the corner 
of 20th and Washington Blvd. was the "part" of the property bargained 
for, and reform the agreement to include said description (emphasis 
supplied). It is a clear error in light of the testimony, for the 
Caurt to allow reformation totally excluding that portion of the property 
which plaintiff and defendant admitted was to have been included 
as the parking area (See Transcript Pages 42, 71, 79, 88, 91, 112, 113, 
117); and in light of the testimony of both plaintiff and defendant, it is 
an error to conclude as a Finding of Fact that a reformed agreement 
excluding the property bargained for would not interfere with defendants 
peaceable possession. Ken Holt said at Page 87 Line 26, "he would have 
never signed the lease if he had known he had no blacktopped parking." 
Finding of Fact Number 8 totally dehors the record. Plaintiffs 
and defendants causes of action are clearly set forth in their Complaint, 
Answer, and Counterclaim, and at no place in the pleadings do the defendants 
request the Court to assist them in exercising an option for the property 
bargained. The balance of the Finding is immaterial. 
Finding of Fact Number 9 is quoted in its entirety for the purpose 
Of the defendant IS argument as· follOWS: 
"The court find (sic) that the scribblers error does not 
release the defendants from the Lease." 
Is this a fact to be derived from the testimony! Who is the 
scribbler (sic)? To conclude as a fact that a scribblers error does not 
release the defendants, per se presumes that there was, in fact, an error 
-9-
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(emphasis supplied). If the error was an error 1n the legal descripti~ 
is the Court allowed the prerogative of reforming the lease and writing 
a new agreementwhich excludes a right bargained for by the defendants. 
Reasonable minds can only come to one conclusions in that respect: No. 
(See Transcript Pages 42, 67, 71, 79, 88, 91, 112, 113, 117). 
In Finding of Fact Number 12, the Court found from the testimony of 
the defendant that the defendant never mentioned any parking problem 
to the plaintiff prior to a written letter in September, 1975; and furthe: 
found that the defendants never had any problems with the parking. 
This simply is not true. Even the plaintiff admitted he was 
informed about the parking problem by the defendant during the time the 
continued payment of rent came into question. The testimony of the 
plaintiff in this respect is quoted to show the clear error of this 
finding, Transcript Page 54 and 55, beginning with Line 26 through 
30; and Page 55 Lines 1 through 5. 
Q: Mr. Desbouillons, in direct examination Mr. Vlahos asked you 
whether or not in these conversations you have had with Ken Holt 
on the telephone, whether anything was discussed concerning his 
parking problems with Mr. Tony Dekazos? Isn't it a fact that 
he indicated to you that he was having numerous problems with 
Mr. Dekazos? 
A: He indicated to me th~t he had had some problems with Tony 
and that, or I believe that he--I think he said that Hal had 
been havine some words with Tony, not him. I think that's 
what he said. 
The unrefuted testimony of the defendant, Ken Holt, on the 
other hand, shows that the plaintiff was informed of the parking problem 
long before the plaintiff sued for past due rent (See Transcript Page 
79, Lines 19 thrugh 28; and Pages 88, 91, 112, 113, 117). The mere 
act of informing the plaintiff of the parking problem is not material 
to a decision in this matter by this Honorable Court, but it has materiaL 
-·10-
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affected the Judgment of the lower 
that the defendant's really had no parking problem 
real problem was economical rather than physical. In Exhibit 6, Page 
2, the defendant informed the plaintiffs that one reason he desired 
to renegotiate the Lease/Purchase Agreement was because of the parking 
problem which was "plaguing them." Said Exhibit was offered without 
objection and states in considerable detail numerous factors which the 
defendants were concerned with, including the parking problem and cannot be 
ignored by the lower Court. 
In Finding of Fact Number 13, the lower Court ambiguously found 
that the plaintiffs had never misrepresented anything to the defendants 
and that the defendant was aware of the property he was leasing, and 
the parking arrangement. The defendant submits to this Court that at 
no time did he represent on cross-examination or direct-examination 
that the plaintiff had never misrepresented anything to him. The only 
testimony upon which the Court could rely for such a finding, is 
found beginning at Line 29 on Page 94 through Line 11 on Page 95. Mr. 
Holt, in response to a rather meaningless and ambiguous question, merely 
stated that Mr. Desbouillons had been fair with him and he inspected 
the property prior to the time the Lease •.vas signed. This testimony 
(Transcript Page 95 and 96) cannot possibly support the finding that 
the plaintiffs had never misrepresented anything to the defendant, in 
light of Exhibit 1, which included the representation by the plaintiff 
that he owned the property described in the Lease, and which he had 
pointed out to Ken Holt as the joint parking area (Transcript Page 
42, Line 14 through 21). In addition, in light of the numerous wit-
nessess who testified that the lessee of the adjoining property was 
-11-
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going to install a fence so that Mr. Holt could no longer use the parki~ , 
area; and in light of the testimony of Mr. Desbouillons on Page 21, 
Lines 25 through 27, stating that the parking around the building at 
20th and Washington was very minimal, the finding of the Court that the 
defendant was aware of the parking arrangement becom~meaningless. , 
In sunnnary, it becomes patently obvious that the judicial reformation! 
of the agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant to lease 
real property 1n Ogden is based upon such erroneous and unfounded Find~p 
of Fact as to make the Judgment appear to be the product of chance. 
There is no question that each and every material witness for the 
plaintiffs and the defendants testified that the lease agreement was 
entered into by both parties after negotiations and reliance upon 
representations that the parking, which was vital to defendant's business1 
was available to the northwest of the main building (Transcript 
Page 116 Line 9 through 13). The plaintiff admitted that he informed 
the defendant that he had given consideration for the parking area, and 
he had in fact described the parking area to the defendant as the 
same later included by plaintiff's attorney in Exhibit 1, as part of 
the leased premises. Without pleading for reformation, and without 
establishing that the lease was ambiguous on its face, the court allowed 
objectionable evidence to be admitted, and it relyed upon the unsworn 
statement of plaintiff's attorney respecting a "scribblers" error. 
There is no question from the testimony that the defendant leased 
property from the plaintiff which was to have included the parking area. 
There is no question that said area did not only not bel •'ng to the 
plaintiffs, but the plaintiff's had absolutely no right with respect to 
property upon which the defendants could rely in the enforcement of the~ 
-12-
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agreement. The 
since there was apparently never a meeting of the minds between the 
pl~intiff and the defendant with respect to the parking area; and 
if there was a mistake as to the parking area, the mistake was unilateral 
and made by the plaintiff and his counsel. 
The defendant knew the area to be used for parking, and knew 
that the same was part of that which he had bargained for, for the 
plaintiff described it in the Lease. The plaintiff knew the area which was 
to be used for parking and represented that it was part of the property 
bargained for. For the plaintiff to be allowed to reform the Lease 
and totally exclude the area reserved for parking, negates the entire 
agreement and renders it voidable. 
POINT II 
A MISREPRESENTATION OF A MATERIAL FACT, IF ACTED UPON BY ONE PARTY TO 
HIS DETRIMENT, WILL CONSTITUTE SUFFICIENT GROUND FOR RECISSION AND 
CANCELLATION OF CONTRACT IN EQUITY BECAUSE THERE WAS NO ~ruTUAL ASSENT 
TO ALL THE TERMS OF THE CONTRACT--NO ~lEEriNG OF THE MINDS--HENCE, NO 
VALID CONTRACT CAN BE CREATED. 
The record shows that the plaintiff represented owner·ship of 
what he did not ovm and could not deliver, thereby breaching Lessor's 
implied covenant of quiet enjoyment (See Exhibit 1). This representation 
was material because parking was vital to the conduct of the defendant's 
business, and the defendants relied upon the misrepresentation. See 
Transcript Page 42, Lines 9 through 21. 
The holder of the paramount legal title subsequently asserted 
control, thereby depriving defendants of the use of the parking. The 
exercise of this control constituted constructive eviction of defendants 
from the premises demised, (See Transcript Page 1). 
-13-
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This mistake. being unilateral in nature, is ground for rescission, 
not reformation, as the lower court has done, the reason being that 
there was never a mutual assent to all the terms of the contract--no 
meeting of the minds--and the court cannot negotiate a contract for the 
parties different than they themselves bargained for. 17 Am Jur 2d 
Section 242, Pg. 627. Contracts. 
Furthermore, the mistake has been established by the testimony 
of Plaintiff, which fact also requires rescission. 
In this case, the Lease was clear and unambiguous. Lessor /Plaintiff 
claimed to be the owner of the property as set forth in the Lease 
executed by all parties. It was represented by the plaintiffs that 
part of the leased premises behind the Cedars Lounge was to used by 
the defendants to operate their business. Transcript Page 42, Lines 
14 through 21, cross-examination by Mr. Rothey: 
Q: Mr. Desbouillons, did you in fact, represent to Mr. 
Holt that parking was available for the building situated at 
20th and Washington behind the Cedars? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And isn't it a fact that the parking area you pointed 
out physically to Mr. Holt is described in the first legal 
description of paragraph 1 of the lease? 
A: Yes 
Plaintiff was also aware that parking was a material factor 
in the negotiations. Transcript Page 42, Line 4 through 13, cross-
examination of plaintiff by Mr. Rothey: 
Q: As I understand your testimony you state on the basis 
of the representations you made to Mr. Holt and his associtates 
concerning this parking that that was an integral part of Mr. 
Holt's decision with respect to this building; is this correct? 
A: I don't know whether it was an integral part. It was a 
part of his perusal of the property. 
-14-
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Q: 
A: I don't know whether concern is the word. He 
Transcript Page 21, Line 9 through 15, Direct by Mr. Vlahos. 
Q: Was there ever a discussion concerning parking, Mr. 
Des bouillons? 
A: Yes 
Q: Do you recall when and where this conversation took place? 
A: It was during the times that Ken was checking the property 
and it was part of his overall decision. 
In addition to plaintiff's mistaken representation of parking, his 
attorney has clearly stated to the court in the Transcript Page 62, Lines 
25 and 26 that, 
" ... It's a scrivener's error, and I take full responsibility 
for the error, ... " 
It is established from the record that both plaintiff and his 
attorney were mistaken in representations made to defendant regarding 
the parking. 
It is also established from testimony that parking was ab-
solutely necessary to defendant and that he intended to lease the parking. 
Transcript Page 71, Lines 2 through 28. 
A: Well, Mr. Desbouillons, and I, and Hal Stonebaker, and I 
think Dave was present. We discussed the parking lot. He 
mentioned that he had blacktopped the whole parking lot. 
Q: Did he mention that you had those privileges in connection 
with anyone else? 
A: Yes, he did. He said, "Now is this a joint parking lot," 
and he says, "Tony uses those parking lots right adjacent and 
close to his building, and you have the rest of the back of the 
pat·king lot." 
Q: And I take it you were present this morning; were you not, 
during the testimony of Mr. Desbouillons? 
A: Yes 
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Q: Do you recall the question directed to hi~ by his counsel 
where his cou~se~ asked him whether there was sufficent parking 
around the bu1ld1ng on 20th and Washington without the parking 
spaces you're describing? Do you remember that question? 
A: (nods head up and down) 
Q: Do you remember Mr. Desbouillons' answer? 
A: He mentioned that there wasn't. 
Q: And do you agree or disagree? 
A: I agree. 
Q: Was parking necessary for the operation of your business 
there Mr. Holt? 
A: It's vitally important, and it's an absolute necessity. 
Q: Was it necessary for you to have the parking described by 
Mr. Desbouillons in order to operate the Ogden store property. 
A: I had to have that parking. It was absolutely necessary. 
And then when I run into that parking problem, that really 
upset me. I just didn't know which way to go or which way to turn. 
I lost many sleepless nights, and each time that I contacted 
Des, or Nr. Desbouillons, on the telephone I explained to him 
about the parking problem, and he was aware of it. 
The parking was an "absolute necessity" according to defendant's 
testimony. Plaintiff, Mr. Desbouillons, testifies that parking was part 
of defendant's "overall decision," (Transcript Page 21, Lines 9 through 
15; and Transcript Page 42, Lines 4 through 13), and that parking was 
considered.. Both have been previously cited. 
The record clearly indicates that plaintiff and his attorney 
misrepresented a material fact to defendant regarding availability of 
parking that plaintiff did not own and did not control. It is of 
no importance whether the misrepresentation was deliberate or innocent, 
since defendant relied upon it and executed the lease. 
The majority opinion in the United States regarding contractual 
mistake 1s reflected in the case of Langley v. Irons Land and Developme~ 
Co. 114 So 769 (Fla. 1927) and is to the effect that innocent m1s-
representation of fact, if acted upon in reli3nce by tl1e other party, is 
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ground for recission and cancellation in 
minds ever occured. The Langley court said: Quoting 
Contracts P 1167 §18 
"Where a contract in wr1t1ng is executed by only one of the 
parties, under a mistake as to a fact which is of the essence 
of the contract, the mistake constitutes a ground for a court 
of equity to rescind and cancel the apparent contract as written 
and to place the parties in statu quo, but it does not con-
stitute a ground for reformation, the reason being that by the 
mistake of one of the parties, there was no mutual assent to all 
the terms of the contract--no meeting of the minds--and 
hence there is no prior contract to which the writing may 
be made to conform. As stated by an eminent .ext-writer: A 
mistake on one side may be ground for rescinding a contract, or 
for refusing to enforce its specific performance; but it can not 
be a ground for altering its terms. Where such a state of facts 
exists, and the mistaken party is seeking reformation of a 
written instrument, the court at the instance of the other 
party, will treat the case as though no writing has ever 
existed and will restore the parties to their original 
positions." 
Further on, the Court went on to cite Black on Rescission and 
Cancellation, p. 385 § 140 says: 
"Equity will grant relief, by way of rescission or cancellation, 
from a contract or conveyance based upon a substantial mis-
understanding of the parties as to the subject matter of the 
contract, though the mistake was entirely innocent on both 
sides and there was no fraud or misrepresentation." 
And further, 
"So, in a sale of real estate, if one party believes he ia 
buying a particular piece of property while the other thinks 
he is selling another piece, there is no meeting of minds so 
as to constitute a valid contract." 
In Sutton v Cast-Crete Corporation of Florida 197 So. 2d 5~ 
(1967) it was clearly set forth that a mistake or misrepresentation 
of material facts, if acted upon by the other party to his detriment, 
constitutes a sufficient ground for rescission and cancellation in 
equity. 
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Citing Langley v. Irons Land & Development Co., (supra) the 
Sutton Court stated: 
"The leading case in Florida on rescission of contracts because 
of misrepresentation of fact, whether innocent or otherwise 
is Langley v. Irons Land & Development Co., 1927, 94 Fla. ' 
1010 114 So. 769, wherein Justice Buford made an exhaustive 
exposition of the law, quoting from Ruling Case Law, c. J., 
Black on Rescission and Cancellation, and other authorities. 
The holding in said opinion, most closely applicable to the 
facts here, is as follows (text 114 So. 771): 
"Innocent Misrepresentation of Facts: According to the 
weight of authority, misrepresentation of material facts, al-
though innocently made, if acted on by the other .party to his 
detriment, will constitute a sufficient ground for rescission 
and cancellation in equity. The real inquiry is not whether 
the party making the representations knew it to be false, 
but whether the other party believed it to be true and was 
misled by it in making the contract; and, whether the mis-
representation is made innocently or knowingly, the effect 
is the same. It is as conclusive a ground of relief in 
equity as a willful and false assertion, for it operates as 
a surprise and imposition on the other party; and in such 
case the party must be held to his representations." 
Another case in point is International Harvester Cr. Cor~ 
v East Coast Truck 387 F. Supp. 820 (Fla. 1974) citing Langley v. 
Sutton. The weight of authority clearly directs a Judgment of rescission 
for an award of damages to the defendant for expenses incurred in 
moving in and out of the premises because of the unilateral mistake 
of the plaintiff representing that he owned or had an intePest ~<hich 
he could demise. 
POINT III 
THE COURT ERRED IN ALLO\HNG PLAINTIFF TO ESTABLISH A mSTAKE BY 
INADHISSIBLE PAROL EVIDENCE AND EXTRINSIVE EVIDENCE FOR THE 
PURPOSE OF REFORmNG THE AGREE}lENT, THEREBY EXCLUDING PROPERTY DES-
CRIBED IN THE LEASE AND REPRESENTED BY BOTH PARTIES TO BE PART OF 
THE PROPERTY BARGAINED FOR. 
Utah Code Annotated Section 78-25-16 (1953) provides that 
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no evidence will 
instrument other than the writing 
cases. 
In this case, both plaintiff and defendant testified 
negotiated for the lease of certain real property and improvements 
described variously for the purpose of this Brief, as Parcels A, B, 
and C: Parcel A was the real property situated on the corner of 20th 
and Washington Blvd., and was not included in the final Lease prepared 
by the plaintiff's attorney; Parcel B was an unimproved lot to the 
west of Parcel A, which at the time, was burdened by a condemmed 
house, covered with weeds, and separated from Parcel A by a fence; 
Parcel C was an improved parking lot to the north of Parcel A, but 
situated to the rear of a business known as the Cedars Lounge. 
When the plaintiff's attorney prepared the written lease, he 
included a legal description of Parcels B and C, along with the re-
presentation that the plaintiff was the owner of said property. There 
1s no ambiguity infue legal description of Parcel B or C, but the 
court allowed the plaintiff to testify, over the defendants objection, 
that the legal description of Parcel C was in error and that the only 
descriptions he intended to include were the descriptions of Parcels 
A and B. Further, at page 62 of the reporter's Transcript, plaintiffs' 
counsel attempted to establish, by his own unsworn testimony, that the 
inclusion of Parcel C in the lease was his own error; and in doing so, 
counsel for plaintiff relied upon Exhibit 16, which plaintiffs' counsel 
had prepared in an unrelated matter, to establish the error. This 
Exhibit was admitted by the lower court over defendants' objection, both 
as materiality and parol evidence. 
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Both plaintiff and defendant testified, (op. cit. pp 5 and 6) 
that Parcel C was intended by the plaintiff to become the parking area 
be used by the defendant and that said parking was vital to the busines 
of the defendant. 
In light of these circumstances, the Court not only erred in 
allowing the testimony of the plaintiff to vary the terms agreed upon 
by both the plaintiff and defendant, but totally misapprehended the 
agreement of the parties when it proceeded to reform the agreement to 
include only Parcel A and B to the total exclusion of Parcel C. 
It is not Defendant/Appellants' contention that Parcel A, which 
was clearly intended by the parties to be included as part of the lease, 
could not otherwise be included by the court in a reformed agreement 
without regard to parol evidence. Plaintiff accepted Lease payments 
on monthly basis. It is the defendants contention, however, that to 
allow ~rinsic evidence such as Exhibit 16 to totally exclude a 
parcel of ground, which both parties admit was part of the thing 
bargained for, does in fact violate the parol evidence rule. The 
general rule is found in 49 Am Jur. 2d, Section 145, to the effect that 
parol evidence is admissible to vary or contradict the terms of a 
written lease except as it is shown that because of fraud, accident, 
or mistake in writing, it fails to express the actual agreement of the 
parties citing various cases incill1ing Farr v. Wasatch Chemical Company, 
105 Utah 272, 143, Pacific 2d .281, 151, ALF 275. In the case of Last 
Chance Ranch Co. in the Supreme Court of Utah, 25 P. 2d 952 (1953), 
the Supreme Court of the State of Utah, in circumstancesanalogous to the 
present case, stated as follows: 
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a 
"The application of such doctrine does not help the respondent, 
for on page 1169 the author further says that, where the effect 
of parol evidence contradicting the consideration expressed 
in the instrument or showing the true consideration to be different 
therefrom would be to change or defeat the legal operation and 
effect of the instrument, or to add new matter to an agreement 
complete upon its face, the evidence is not admissible; for 
in such case, says the author, it comes within the rule which 
forbids the introduction of parol evidence to vary, contradict, 
or defeat the terms of a written instrument. Many cases are 
cited in support thereof. The proposition is well put in 4 
Jones' Commentaries on Evidence (2d Ed.) 2854, that, "if 
the consideration stated appears as a clear and unambiguous 
statement of part of the agreement, representing an actual 
contractual term and something more than a mere formal re-
quisite, such a term of the contract must be regarded in the 
same light as any other material term of the contract and 
extrinsic evidence to vary or contradict it is inadmissible: 
and that "a party cannot, under the guise of varying the 
consideration, ingraft new terms and covenants upon the 
writing by extrinsic evidence." To that effect is also 
Page on the Law of Contracts, val. 4 § 2164." 
In addition to the support of the cases cited above, it should 
be recalled that the Lease in this case was prepared entirely by 
plaintiff/respondent. The rule is that uncertainties in the construction 
of a Lease will be resolved strictly against the one who prepared the 
document. See Bell v. Minor 88 Cal. App. 2d 879, 199 Pacific 2d 718. 
Under this rule, taken in connection with the parol evidence rule, the 
only reasonable explanation for the presence in the Lease of the grant 
of the exclusive rights to Parcel C, is that such parcel was bargained 
for between the plaintiff and the defendant as a necessary part of their 
transaction. Plaintiff/Respondent cannot now be allowed to resolve the 
problem through parol evidence which totally excluded the parcel 
bargained for. 
CONCLUSION 
In this case, the plaintiff is bound by law to know what property 
he controlled and ,.,hat property he had a right to lease. He should have 
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known that he did not have parking facilities behind the Cedars as he 
represented, and he should not·have shown the defendant a parcel of ground 
and then said "that is your parking," unless he h3d the unqualified right 
to the quiet enjoyment of the ground he professed to control. 
Plaintiff misled defendant into doing something defendant would 
not otherwise have done, and that is purely and simply grounds for 
recission not reformation. The net effect of the trial court's Judgment 
allowing reformation is to permit the plaintiff to misrepresent a material 
fact concerning the availability of parking which plaintiff bargained 
for; and then to deny the defendant the benefit of that bargain, and 
ignoreplaintiff's misrepresentation. 
This Honorable Court, in light of these facts, should reverse 
the Judgment of the lower Court and enter a Judgment rescind i.ng the agree-
ment between plaintiff and defendant; and for damages in favor of the 
defendant for such amount as was proven at trial to have been incurred 
in reliance upon the misrepresented 
KE NETH L. ROTHEY 
At orncy for Defendan~Appellant 
Mailed one copy of the Brief of Appellant to Mr. Pete N. Vlahos 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondents, this 8th day of November, 19!7, at 
Legal Forum Building 2447 Kiesel Avenue, Ogden, '\Jta~. 8440];. ) /7 
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